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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of large institutional owners on accounting for goodwill and its resulting impairment charges.
Economies of scale predict stronger incentives for large institutional owners to engage in monitoring. Employing a multivariate
linear probability model on a sample of U.S. companies with goodwill on their balance sheets during the period from 2009 to
2019, I find that the likelihood of an impairment is more strongly related to an expected impairment when the share of equity
held by the firm’s largest institutional owners is higher. Results prove to be economically meaningful and are generally robust
to different specifications. This evidence is consistent with the active monitor hypothesis by large shareholders to protect their
significant investments.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines whether the presence of large insti-
tutional owners is associated with a firm’s decision to impair
goodwill.1 In detail, this paper aims to shed light on the ques-
tion whether an increase in the firm’s largest institutional
owners is associated with an increased likelihood of a firm to
report an expected impairment of goodwill, as indicated by
the firm’s book-to-market ratio. Lapointe-Antunes, Cormier,
and Magnan (2009) provide evidence that an impairment of
goodwill is negatively associated with the firm’s share price.
Consistent with this, AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares, and Haddad
(2012) argue that goodwill impairments are significant ac-
counting decisions that receive considerable attention by cap-
ital market participants. According to the annual goodwill
impairment study by Duff and Phelps (2019), goodwill im-
pairments by U.S. publicly listed companies reached a total
of $78.9 billion in 2018. This is an increase of 125% over
the amount recorded in 2017. Given its growing prevalence
1Institutional ownership is defined following the Form 13F by the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). All institutional invest-
ment managers with over $100 million of equity assets under management
report their shareholdings quarterly using the SEC’s Form 13F filing.
and that it negatively affects net income, goodwill impair-
ment is subject to considerable debate by academics, stan-
dard setters, and practitioners. This has been noticed pre-
dominantly in recent years, as goodwill has become an in-
creasingly larger portion of the assets transferred to a firm
in business combinations due to the fact that the value of
many firms has shifted from tangible assets to intangible as-
sets. Hence, goodwill impairments have an increasing influ-
ence on the firm’s financial reporting outcome and are there-
fore highly relevant to outside investors as any impairment
directly affects their shareholdings. Yet, relatively little is
known about how large institutional owners behave with re-
gard to the goodwill impairment decision of firms. This paper
aims to provide some insights on this association.
With the introduction of Statement of Financial Account-
ing Standards (SFAS) 142, standard setters usually refer to
the private information argument when claiming the con-
ceptual advantages of the impairment-only approach over
the systematic amortization of goodwill (AbuGhazaleh, Al-
Hares, & Roberts, 2011). The private information argument
refers to the assumption that managers have private infor-
mation that is unknown to outside shareholders. In this con-
text of asymmetric information, the decision whether and to
what extent goodwill is impaired reveals information to the
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5282/jums/v6i2pp408-423
S. Hahn / Junior Management Science 6(2) (2021) 408-423 409
public about the expected future cash flows of the respective
reporting unit to which goodwill has been allocated (Fields,
Lys, & Vincent, 2001). However, this argument is subject to
the implicit assumption that both managers and sharehold-
ers of firms pursue the same objectives. Consequently, the
impairment-only approach has been discussed controversial
among academics, standard setters and practitioners. While
proponents argue that the impairment-only approach bet-
ter reflects economic reality (Chalmers, Godfrey, & Webster,
2011), critics argue that it provides opportunities of manage-
rial discretion as impairment tests are unverifiable (Ramanna
& Watts, 2012). As a result, research has found strong evi-
dence that decision makers at the firm-level may delay or
avoid recording impairments by using the subjectivity inher-
ent in the goodwill impairment test procedure opportunisti-
cally (e.g., Li & Sloan, 2017; Ramanna & Watts, 2012).
Regarding the role and behavior of institutional owners,
corporate governance literature establishes monitoring as a
powerful governance solution available to shareholders to in-
fluence managers (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
In a seminal paper concerning the role of large sharehold-
ers, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that a shareholder
who owns a large stake of the firm has proper incentives to
monitor its management to safeguard their significant share-
holdings. However, monitoring comes with costs, and insti-
tutional owners may rely on governance mechanisms other
than monitoring or pursue a passive investment strategy. In
this vein, prior research finds evidence that, instead of engag-
ing in costly monitoring, institutional owners might choose to
rely on “exit” and sell off their shareholdings (Coffee, 1991;
Manconi, Massa, & Yasuda, 2012).
To empirically examine whether large institutional own-
ers compel managers to record an impairment of goodwill, I
follow prior research (Beatty & Weber, 2006; Francis, Hanna,
& Vincent, 1996; Ramanna & Watts, 2012) and use a market-
based indicator of goodwill impairment: The firm’s book-to-
market ratio. This approach is based on the rationale that
the firm’s market capitalization is a suitable proxy for share-
holders’ estimate of the firm’s net present value of future cash
flows. As SFAS 142 requires an impairment whenever the fair
value of the reporting unit is below its carrying value, I argue
that shareholders expect an impairment when the firm’s mar-
ket value of equity is below its book value of equity. Conse-
quently, there are only two explanations for the management
not to record an impairment of goodwill when the market
value of equity is below its book value. First, in line with
the private information argument, managers possess inside
information that the net present value of future cash flows is
higher than expected by the market. Second, managers op-
portunistically use the available discretion to their own ad-
vantage and delay necessary impairments of goodwill.
Using a sample of U.S. publicly listed companies with
goodwill on their balance sheets during the period from 2009
to 2019, I find evidence consistent with the monitoring view.
Specifically, as the share of the largest institutional owners
increases, there is a higher likelihood that the firm reports
more timely goodwill impairments. Further, I perform an
additional set of sensitivity analyses to stress the economic
significance of the results. Results prove to be robust to nar-
rowing the definition of goodwill impairments to only those
that are material to the firm, using an alternative accounting-
based indicator of goodwill impairment, and excluding the
period of the financial crisis from the sample.
In summary, the paper adds to the literature in at least
two ways. First, I contribute by examining a further determi-
nant of accounting choices of goodwill impairment by man-
agers. I find evidence that the accounting decision to record
a necessary goodwill impairment is at least partly affected
by monitoring activities of the firm by institutional owners.
Second, I look at the effect of institutional owners on finan-
cial reporting outcomes by showing that institutional own-
ers effectively serve as monitors on firm behavior. In this
way, my results suggest that ownership concentration helps
in mitigating agency frictions by reducing information asym-
metries, making it more difficult for managers to refer to the
private information argument and instead forcing them to
record more timely impairments of goodwill.
2. Accounting for goodwill
For many years, goodwill acquired in business combina-
tions was treated similarly to other intangible assets. It was
presumed that goodwill has a finite life and thus should be
amortized over its useful life. The maximum amortization
period was up to 40 years. In June 2001, the U.S. Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) significantly changed
the treatment for accounting for goodwill by introducing the
SFAS 141 Business Combinations and SFAS 142 Goodwill
and Other Intangible Assets (Financial Accounting Standards
Board, 2001a, 2001b).
With the introduction of these standards, the amortiza-
tion of goodwill approach was abolished. Instead, firms are
required to conduct an impairment test based on the report-
ing unit’s fair value at least once a year. The central objective
of SFAS 142 is to improve the reflection of the true economic
value of goodwill in financial reporting. Under the provisions
of SFAS 142, the impairment-only approach is described as
a two-step process. First, the firm needs to determine the
fair value of the reporting unit and compare it to its carry-
ing amount. According to paragraph 30 of SFAS 142, a re-
porting unit is defined as the lowest level of business units
for which discrete financial information is available (Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board, 2001b, para. 30). In the
event the fair value exceeds the carrying amount, no further
testing is required, and thus no impairment is required. Sec-
ond, only in the event, the carrying amount of the reporting
unit exceeds the fair value, the implied fair value of goodwill
needs to be calculated by measuring the reporting unit’s fair
value of net assets other than goodwill. Finally, the calcu-
lated value needs to be subtracted from the fair value of the
reporting unit, and the difference is subject to impairment.
To sum up, on the one hand, the use of estimates on good-
will’s fair value allows managers to release their private infor-
mation on future cash flows. On the other hand, managers
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are granted a certain degree of discretion in exercising the
associated accounting choices. The first accounting choice
is the managerial flexibility in defining the reporting units.
The second accounting choice is the managerial discretion
in determining the fair value of the reporting unit. The as-
sessment of the fair value requires the management to make
subjective judgments on future economic performance, dis-
count rate, and current replacement values of assets. Taken
together, SFAS 142 allows for managerial discretion in es-
timating impairment charges with respect to its timing and
amount.
3. Literature review
This section is divided into two parts. The first part offers
a review of previous research on accounting for goodwill, fo-
cusing on the goodwill impairment decision and its determi-
nants. The second part looks at research on the role and the
behavior of institutional owners in monitoring firm behav-
ior. Special attention is given to evidence on corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms that impact the goodwill impairment
decision.
3.1. Goodwill impairment
The primary purpose of this paper is to extend the existing
literature on accounting for goodwill and the determinants
driving the goodwill impairment decision. A stream of liter-
ature closely related to the current paper includes studies on
the antecedents of goodwill impairment reporting. Review-
ing these papers indicates that the decision to write down
goodwill balances is associated with characteristics of the ini-
tial acquisition and agency-theory based motives (e.g., Gu &
Lev, 2011; Hayn & Hughes, 2006; Li & Sloan, 2017; Ramanna
& Watts, 2012).
Specifically, Hayn and Hughes (2006) look at the post-
acquisition performance of U.S. based firms between 1988
and 1998. They find that the likelihood of an impairment
of goodwill “is related to an initial overpayment as indicated
by acquisition characteristics such as payment of a large pre-
mium over the pre-acquisition stock price of the target and
the use of stock rather than cash as a mean of payment”
(Hayn & Hughes, 2006, p. 241). In the same vein, Gu and
Lev (2011) find that the buyer’s overvalued share price at
acquisition induces managers to overpay for the target that
ultimately results in the impairment of goodwill.
A large body of research finds that the impairment-only
approach under the SFAS 142 regime provides opportuni-
ties for managerial discretion as impairment tests are unver-
ifiable (e.g., Beatty & Weber, 2006; Li & Sloan, 2017; Ra-
manna & Watts, 2012). The underlying theoretical frame-
work is referred to as agency theory and predicts the man-
agement to opportunistically use the available discretion in
their own interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zim-
mermann, 1986). According to prior research, incentives
for opportunistically managing goodwill impairments pre-
dicted by agency theory are based on: (i) contractual issues
such as compensation agreements or debt covenants written
on goodwill accounts (Fields et al., 2001; LaFond & Watts,
2008), (ii) management reputation concerns (Francis et al.,
1996; Gu & Lev, 2011), or (iii) equity market valuation con-
cerns (Beatty & Weber, 2006).
First, contractual issues refer to contracts linked to ac-
counting ratios that include impairment effects of goodwill
and thus incentivize managers to delay necessary impair-
ments as they would be directly harmed by its consequences.
Furthermore, the potential violation of debt covenants writ-
ten on accounting ratios can cause the decision to delay nec-
essary goodwill impairments (Fields et al., 2001).
Second, as an impairment decision by definition conveys
information to shareholders that expected future cash flows
no longer hold, the impairment decision bears the risk of
reputational damages of the firm’s management. In conse-
quence and confirmed by prior research, shareholders may
question the managerial capabilities of managers responsible
for the underlying acquisition (Gu & Lev, 2011). In this re-
gard, Francis et al. (1996) provide arguments that decision
makers on the firm-level tend to manage goodwill impair-
ment opportunistically to protect their reputation, such as
the opportunistic reporting of goodwill impairments to meet
market expectations.
Third, based on the reasoning that goodwill impairments
impact the firm’s stock price, managers could use the avail-
able managerial discretion to inflate earnings and thus, the
stock price. Beatty and Weber (2006) examine the deter-
minants of a (non-) impairment decision in the SFAS 142
transition period. They find that market incentives and con-
tracting incentives impact managerial decisions on whether,
when, and how much goodwill impairment to record. In de-
tail, they find that the likelihood of managers to record an
impairment of goodwill is associated with incentives related
to earnings-based compensation, CEO tenure, and exchange
delisting. This view is supported by Guler (2007), who finds
that concerns of negative valuation consequences lead man-
agers to manipulate financial statements with respect to the
true value of goodwill. Thus, agency theory offers a strong
theoretical framework for arguing that goodwill impairments
are not a mere reflection of economic reality but rather the
opportunistic use of the available managerial discretion to
maximize manager’s own utility.
Along these lines, Ramanna and Watts (2012) study a
sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impair-
ment and test whether a decision to not impair goodwill is ei-
ther related to the release of private information held by the
firm’s management or the opportunistic use of available man-
agerial discretions predicted by agency theory.2 They find ev-
idence in line with agency-based predictions. Based on these
findings, the recent paper by Li and Sloan (2017) studies the
timeliness of goodwill impairments both before and after the
implementation of SFAS 142. They find that the elimination
2Ramanna and Watts (2012) define market indications of goodwill im-
pairment as positive book goodwill and a book-to-market ratio above one.
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of systematic amortization and the introduction of unverifi-
able impairment tests has resulted in a relative increase in
inflated goodwill balances and less timely impairment deci-
sions. Contrariwise, Lee (2011) finds that the adoption of
SFAS 142 with its impairment-only approach has increased
the ability of goodwill to forecast future cash flows.
Another stream of literature closely related to my work
includes studies on the impact of different governance mech-
anisms on the goodwill impairment decision. Glaum, Lands-
man, and Wyrwa (2018) research the effectiveness of moni-
toring by institutional owners as a substitute for a weak pub-
lic enforcement environment. Using a sample of stock-listed
firms from 21 countries, they find that monitoring by insti-
tutional owners compensates for a weak public enforcement
environment with respect to the goodwill impairment deci-
sion. Ayres, Campbell, Chyz, and Shipman (2019) argue
that the presence of financial analysts pressures managers to-
wards more timely impairments of goodwill. In detail, they
find that the likelihood of a firm to report a necessary im-
pairment of goodwill increases with the number of analysts
following a firm. In a somewhat related paper, L. H. Chen,
Krishnan, and Sami (2015) finds that an increased level of in-
stitutional ownership mitigates the negative effects of good-
will impairments on analyst forecast dispersion. Lastly, the
paper by Li and Sloan (2017) provides some initial evidence
that higher institutional ownership mitigates the managerial
discretion in goodwill testing and leads to more timely im-
pairments of goodwill. All these findings stress the important
effects of outside monitors on the firm’s information environ-
ment
3.2. Institutional ownership
The prior section discussed some of the potential mo-
tives of managers to opportunistically manage goodwill im-
pairment losses at the expense of the outside shareholders.
This section provides an overview of prior research on the
role and the behavior of institutional owners with regard to
their shareholdings. Formally, the conflicting interests be-
tween outside shareholders and managers evolve from the
separation of the decision and the risk-bearing function and
is referred to as an agency problem (Berle & Means, 1932).
Prior research has established several governance solutions
that can mitigate agency frictions. Monitoring of the man-
agement by shareholders is regarded as such a mechanism
and has been the subject of research for decades (e.g., Jensen
& Meckling, 1976; Monks & Minow, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny,
1986).
In addition to monitoring, other mechanisms and gover-
nance devices have evolved to control for agency problems.
For instance, the capital market exercises an inherent moni-
toring function by exerting pressure on a firm’s management
to drive decisions toward shareholder interests (Holmström
& Tirole, 1993). Further, the market for corporate control
disciplines the firm’s management by providing external par-
ties the opportunity to replace existing management with
poor performance (Manne, 1965).
Nevertheless, monitoring has been frequently featured as
a powerful governance mechanism available to shareholders
(e.g., Brous & Kini, 1994; Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny,
1986). As monitoring involves both costs and benefits, the ul-
timate decision on whether to engage in monitoring depends
on the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis. Thus, based on the
assumption of rationality, a shareholder is willing to engage
in monitoring as long as the benefit of monitoring outweighs
its costs.
The study by Bushee (1998) on the influence of institu-
tional ownership on managerial incentives to decrease invest-
ments in research and development (R&D) finds a negative
association between the level of institutional ownership and
the likelihood to reduce R&D expenses to reverse a decline in
earnings. This finding emphasizes that institutional owners
favor long-term value creation over short-term profit genera-
tion. In a further paper, Bushee (2001) confirms that finding
by showing that there is a positive association between insti-
tutional ownership and the proportion of firm value reflected
in future earnings. Both findings suggest that a large capi-
tal investment in a firm provides incentives for institutional
owners to monitor managers’ actions to ensure that they aim
for long-term profitability. In this vein, Chung, Firth, and
Kim (2002) examine the effect of monitoring by institutional
owners on opportunistic earnings management. They find
that the degree of monitoring institutional owners prevents
managers from the opportunistic steering of reported prof-
its towards the level of profit desired by the managers of the
firm.
With regard to the monitoring thesis, Monks and Minow
(1995) provide evidence that sophisticated institutional own-
ers with large stakes are likely to monitor and discipline man-
agers towards actions that are aligned with the goal of long-
term value creation instead of engaging in short-term profit
generation. In line with that finding, Bethel, Liebeskind, and
Opler (1998) argue that the acquisition of a larger stake by
activist shareholders improves the long-term operating per-
formance of firms. X. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) postulate
that within a cost–benefit framework, long-term oriented in-
stitutions focus on monitoring and influencing, rather than
engaging in short-term profit trading. In a similar spirit, Ji-
ambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2002) test whether
institutional owners engage in monitoring and mitigate firm
agency costs or exacerbate these costs. They provide evi-
dence consistent with the monitoring view.
Regarding the impact of institutional ownership on the
firm’s financial reporting behavior, Liu (2014) researches a
sample of firms that surpassed analysts’ expectations over a
period from 1988 to 2006. Their results indicate that in-
stitutional owners reduce distortions in financial reporting
and concurrently pressure managers to release bad news ear-
lier. Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2010) find that an increased
concentration of monitoring institutional owners reduces the
likelihood of financial misreporting. This view is supported
by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016), who find evidence
that institutional owners frequently employ their voice in or-
der to intervene if they are dissatisfied with the managers’
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actions.
Institutional owners are considered a heterogeneous
rather than a homogeneous group (Gompers & Metrick,
2001). Prior theoretical research argues that the largest
institutional owners are an important source in mitigating
agency problems through monitoring (Huddart, 1993; Maug,
1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). For instance, Maug (1998)
argues that independent institutions with large sharehold-
ings have increased incentives to monitor because they can
profitably trade private information acquired by monitoring.
Based on that theoretical work, empirical research provides
further evidence that large institutional owners perform suc-
cessful monitoring (Bethel et al., 1998; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy,
& Thomas, 2008; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Gillan &
Starks, 2000). Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) empirically
examine the motivation of the five largest pension funds by
studying their shareholder proposals from 1987 to 1993.
They find that these funds actively engage in monitoring
to maximize fund value. Using the theory of economies of
scale, Gillan and Starks (2000) argue that institutions with
large shareholdings have an increased incentive to monitor
as a larger claim on the firm leads to a higher share of the
benefit resulting from monitoring and are therefore more
likely to offset the costs incurred. They further argue that
their shareholdings are frequently so large that selling off
their holdings drives down the share price, thereby incurring
additional losses.
However, there is a body of research arguing that institu-
tional owners may behave less activistic and more short-term
focused (e.g., Coffee, 1991; Manconi et al., 2012). Within
a cost-benefit framework, institutional owners may rely on
governance mechanisms other than monitoring. In this re-
gard, prior research finds evidence that institutional owners
may prefer to sell off their holdings in the case of unfavor-
able performance rather than engaging in monitoring activi-
ties (Coffee, 1991; Manconi et al., 2012). Furthermore, there
is empirical support that institutional owners themselves ex-
ert pressure on the short-term performance of firms, and thus
biasing management towards short-term profit generation
(Bushee, 1998; Graves & Waddock, 1990). Besides empir-
ical evidence, Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) pro-
vide a theoretical framework on short-termism by presenting
a multiperiod agency model demonstrating that institutional
owners use executive compensation contracts as a mean to
incentivize managers to take short-term actions „ which in-
crease the speculative component in the stock price“ (Bolton
et al., 2006, p. 577).
4. Hypothesis development
As Ramanna and Watts (2012) stated, the annual impair-
ment test for goodwill under the SFAS 142 regime allows for a
certain degree of discretion as impairment tests are unverifi-
able. Agency theory provides a strong theoretical framework
and predicts the management to use the available discretion
opportunistically, which is line with prior empirical evidence
(e.g., Li & Sloan, 2017; Ramanna & Watts, 2012).
The objective of this paper is to investigate the role of
large institutional owners in explaining variation in the re-
porting of goodwill impairment that has potentially lost its
economic value. In light of the costs and benefits of monitor-
ing, institutional owners face a decision whether to engage in
monitoring or instead rely on other governance mechanisms.
In this context, monitoring is both the process of information
collection and activities to influence managers’ actions. The
prior literature provides ambiguous evidence regarding the
role and behavior of large institutional owners on the gover-
nance of corporations.
The body of literature arguing for the monitoring view,
suggests that monitoring by institutional owners is a fre-
quently applied governance solution to influence manage-
ment towards shareholders’ interests in order to protect their
significant investments (e.g., Monks & Minow, 1995; Shleifer
& Vishny, 1986). Among the group of institutional owners,
the largest institutional owners are particularly likely to mon-
itor (Brav et al., 2008; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999) for at
least two reasons. First, economies of scale suggest that
monitoring is particularly attractive to large shareholders if
the cost of monitoring has a constant component. Second, as
large institutional owners often have significant holdings, it
is both difficult and costly to sell their shareholdings (Graves
& Waddock, 1990). Furthermore, due to their profession-
alism, these investors have the required capabilities and
expertise to monitor management and ensure that they are
not engaging in activities that adversely affect shareholders’
wealth.
According to this active monitoring hypothesis, insti-
tutional owners who engage in monitoring diminish the
available managerial discretion in the goodwill impairment
decision. This leads to fewer direct agency conflicts between
management and shareholders and disciplines the man-
agement towards shareholders’ interest (Shleifer & Vishny,
1986). Consequently, monitoring by institutional owners’
pressure managers to make timelier goodwill impairments.
Presupposing that large institutional owners engage in mon-
itoring the firm leads to the hypothesis that in the presence
of market indications of goodwill impairment, the share of
equity held by the largest institutional owners is positively
associated with the firm’s likelihood to report an expected
impairment of goodwill.
However, there are at least two reasons why I would ex-
pect to find no association. First, monitoring actions are dif-
ficult to trace. For instance, it may be in the interest of the
large shareholders to not record an expected impairment of
goodwill. Because goodwill impairments have a negative im-
pact on the share price (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2012), large
institutional owners may have motives to prevent a neces-
sary impairment, as they suffer the greatest losses in absolute
terms on their shareholdings. Second, institutional owners
may choose not to engage in costly monitoring activities and
rely on other governance mechanisms or pursue a passive in-
vestment strategy. For example, they may prefer to sell off
their holdings in the case of unfavorable performance rather
than engaging in costly monitoring (Coffee, 1991; Manconi
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et al., 2012).
Ultimately, it is an empirical question to which extent
ownership concentration compels managers to record an ex-
pected impairment of goodwill. Therefore, I formulate my
hypothesis in its null form as follows:
Hypothesis: The likelihood of firms to record an
expected goodwill impairment is not associated




In this section, I will discuss and develop the empirical
strategy for estimating how monitoring by institutional own-
ers affects the likelihood of goodwill impairment. To test the
hypotheses established, I estimate a multivariate linear prob-
ability model where the dependent variable, Impair, is a di-
chotomous variable that equals 1 if goodwill is impaired in a
given firm-year, and 0 otherwise.
On the lines of Francis et al. (1996), I include the firm’s
book-to-market ratio with a value above unity, Btm, as an in-
dication that a firm’s goodwill is economically impaired. Fol-
lowing the argumentation that a book-to-market ratio above
one suggests that the market expects an impairment of good-
will, Btm equals 1 if the firm’s book-to-market ratio in a given
firm-year is above one, and 0 otherwise. Hence, Btm is ex-
pected to be positively related to the impairment decision.3
In order to examine the effect of monitoring by institu-
tional owners, I use two different proxies for firm’s institu-
tional ownership structure. First, I estimate the equation
with the proportion of equity shares held by the firm’s top
one institutional owner in a given firm-year, OS_Top1. As
a second model, I estimate the equation using a variable,
OS_Top3, defined as the cumulative proportion of equity
shares held by the firm’s top three institutional owners in a
given firm-year. From a methodological point of view, the re-
search question to be tested aims at the effect of monitoring
by the largest institutional owner when a firm shows market
indications of goodwill impairment. This specification helps
in exploring whether firms with market indications of good-
will impairment may be more likely to report an impairment
of goodwill, the higher the proportion of equity shares held
by the largest one (three) institutional owners. An interac-
tion term incorporates the joint effect of two variables on the
dependent variable (Impair) over and above their separate
effect.
For this reason, the model includes an interaction effect
between the dichotomous variable of the book-to-market ra-
tio and the share of the largest institutional owners, namely
Btm×OS_Top.4
3Additionally, Beatty and Weber (2006) and Ramanna and Watts (2012)
also use the firm’s book-to-market ratio as a dichotomous expected impair-
ment measure.
4I estimate the model for the proportion of equity shares held by the top
one institutional owner (OS_Top1) and the cumulated proportion of equity
shares held by the top three institutional owners (OS_Top3) separately.
Based on prior literature, I control for several factors that
have been documented to affect the impairment decision.
In detail, control variables include proxies for economic de-
terminants, managerial and firm-level incentives, monitoring
and governance indicators.
Following the research by Francis et al. (1996), I include
the firm’s stock market return as a market-based measure of
economic performance. I interpret a negative (positive) stock
market return as an indicator that the firm lost (gained) its
abilities to generate future cash flows. Thus, the stock mar-
ket return serves as an indicator of necessary goodwill im-
pairments. Consequently, I include the firm’s stock market
return in a given firm-year, Return, and the respective stock
market return in the prior year, ReturnLag. Everything else
equal, I expect a negative sign on both variables.
Furthermore, the model contains variables reflecting
managerial incentives associated with a potential influence
on the impairment of goodwill. According to the literature
on earnings management, a firm’s management is intended
to reduce earnings when it is abnormal high to avoid raising
expectations of stakeholders for future earnings, i.e. income
smoothing (e.g., Acharya & Lambrecht, 2015; Riedl, 2004).
On the contrary, firms with abnormal low earnings in a given
firm-year may take discretionary actions to reduce even fur-
ther the current periods’ earnings, as management is not
penalized proportionately more for additional losses to its
already low earnings (Riedl, 2004). Because goodwill im-
pairment is one mechanism available to the management to
perform these two types of earnings management, I include
two dichotomous variables accounting for this. The first
variable, Smooth, equals 1 if a firm’s net income in a given
firm-year is positive, and the change in income is above the
median change of firms with a positive change in income,
otherwise the variable equals 0. The second variable, Bath,
equals 1 if a firm’s net income in a given firm-year is nega-
tive, and the change in income is below the median change
of the firms with a negative change in income, otherwise the
variable equals 0. I expect a positive relation to the goodwill
impairment decision for both variables, Smooth and Bath.
As a further incentive-related variable, I add a dichoto-
mous variable equal to 1 if the CEO received a cash bonus in
a given firm, named Bonus, and 0 otherwise. Prior research
has shown that in the case of firm performance-related man-
agerial compensation, managers may have an incentive to
make use of the managerial discretion available and avoid or
delay necessary impairments of goodwill (Beatty & Weber,
2006; Ramanna & Watts, 2012). Consequently, I expect a
negative association between Bonus and Impair. Addition-
ally, I include a further CEO-related variable, CeoChange,
which is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if there is a
change in the CEO in a given firm-year, and 0 otherwise.
This follows the findings by Francis et al. (1996) that a recent
change in top management is associated with more frequent
and greater impairments of goodwill. All other things being
equal, I expect a positive sign on this variable.
Furthermore, prior research establishes a link between
debt contracting and the decision of whether to impair good-
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will (Beatty & Weber, 2006; Ramanna & Watts, 2012). Debt
contracts written on goodwill accounts have proven to pro-
vide incentives to a firm’s management to delay or avoid
goodwill impairments. The model takes this into account by
incorporating a variable, Leverage, which is the firm’s total
liabilities divided by total assets before goodwill impairment
in a given firm-year.
Following prior research (e.g., Lapointe-Antunes, Cormier,
& Magnan, 2008; Ramanna & Watts, 2012), I include inde-
pendent variables related to the balance sheet item of good-
will. The first is a proxy for the number of reporting units,
Segment, which is defined as the number of operating seg-
ments of a firm in a given year. The second variable captures
the ratio of goodwill before impairment of goodwill divided
by total assets before impairment of goodwill, GW/TA.
Further, I add a set of additional control variables related
to incentives at the wider firm-level, which have been in-
cluded in prior studies (e.g., Beatty & Weber, 2006; Francis
et al., 1996; Ramanna & Watts, 2012). As a proxy for the size
of a firm, I include the variable Size, which is the logarithm
of the firm’s total assets at the end of the year before goodwill
impairment (Li & Sloan, 2017). The variable Anal ystFol low
is defined as the logarithm of one plus the average number
of security analysts that follow a firm over a given year.5 As
indicated by Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros (1989), security
analysts perform an important monitoring activity and thus
reduce agency costs. Consequently, I expect a positive rela-
tion to the impairment decision. The variable Roa captures
information about the firm’s economic performance and is
defined as a firm’s net income divided by its total assets in a
given year. Based on economic reasoning, I expect a negative
relationship with the impairment decision.
To sum up, the statistical equation for the multivariate
linear probability model has the following general form. Fol-
lowing Petersen (2009), I use robust standard errors clus-
tered at the firm-level. I estimate the equation including in-
dustry and year fixed effects to control for unobserved dif-
ferences in industry characteristics and time specific trends,
potentially reducing bias or inconsistency. To obtain mean-
ingful coefficients for the main effects, I standardize the in-
dependent continuous variables. Therefore, the coefficient of
each of the independent continuous variables represents its
typical effect on the goodwill impairment decision. This is its
effect when the other independent continuous variables are
at their mean, and the magnitude of the coefficient represents
the change in the dependent variable (Impair) associated
with a change of one standard deviation in the independent
continuous variable. The subscripted t represents the differ-
ent time periods, while i typifies each sample firm included
in the model.
5Following Yu (2008), I assume that firms not covered by the Thomson
Reuters I/B/E/S database have no analyst coverage.
Impairi,t =β0 + β1Btmi,t + β2OS−Topi,t
+ β3Btmi,t ×OS_Topi,t + β4Returni,t
+ β5ReturnLagi,t + β6Smoothi,t + β7Bathi,t
+ β8Bonusi,t + β9CoeChangei,t + β10 Leveragei,t
+ β11Segment i,t + β12GW/TAi,t + β13Sizei,t





β j Indust r y j,i + εi,t
(1)
In this specification, the coefficient β3 represents the asso-
ciation between large institutional ownership and the firm’s
likelihood to report an expected impairment of goodwill. An
insignificant coefficient would suggest that the presence of
large institutional owners do not affect the relationship be-
tween an expected impairment and an actual impairment.
In contrast, a positive (negative) and significant coefficient
would indicate that an increase in the share held by the
largest institutional owners leads to a higher (smaller) likeli-
hood of expected impairments.
5.2. Sample selection
The data for the subsequent empirical analysis is gath-
ered from U.S. publicly listed companies. I use firm-level
data on goodwill and institutional ownership from a variety
of sources. My starting point is the data platform Wharton
Research Data Services (WRDS), which contains detailed ac-
counting information for all U.S. publicly listed firms from
different sources. Appendix A6 provides a detailed descrip-
tion of all variables and the respective data source. The sam-
ple consists of firms belonging to the S&P 500 index. The
S&P 500 index consists of the 505 largest firms by market
capitalization listed on stock exchanges in the U.S.. The in-
dex is considered to be a good representation of the U.S. stock
market and thus, a suitable object for empirical research.
Table 1 presents the sample construction process. Firstly,
the top 505 U.S. firms by total market capitalization as listed
by the S&P 500 at July 1, 2020 are selected for a time pe-
riod of eleven years from 2009 through 2019. This results
in initial 555 firm-year observations. I exclude 774 firm-
year observations belonging to the financial sector.7 As de-
scribed by Glaum et al. (2018), the average balance sheet and
capital structure of financial firms are significantly different
from those of classical nonfinancial firms, which implies that
employing the same coefficients on the model could be re-
strictive and thereby introduce coefficient bias. Further, 657
firm-year observations with book goodwill less than $1 mil-
lion and 93 firm-year observations with a negative book-to-
market ratio are excluded. Finally, I lose 1811 observations
due to missing or insufficient data. Taken together, the fi-
6The Appendix can be found on https://jums.academy.
7Classified as Financials with GICS Code 40 in Compustat.
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Table 1: Sample construction
Firm-year
observations
The 505 S&P 500 firms (as listed on July 1, 2020) for the time period from 2009 through 2019 5555
Firm-year observations belonging to the Financials industry (774)
Firm-year observations with book goodwill below $1 million (657)
Firm-year observations with a book-to-market ratio below zero (93)
Firm-year observations with insufficient/missing data (1154)
Final sample 2877
Goodwill impairers 302
Material goodwill impairers: >1% of total assets 123
Material goodwill impairers: >$10 million 257
Non goodwill impairers 2575
Observations with book-to-market ratio above one 44
Observations with a return on assets below minus 10% 38
This table shows the construction process for the final sample.
nal sample of firms for which all data items were available
consists of 343 firms, resulting in a total of 2877 firm-year
observations, of which 302 record an impairment of good-
will.
Table 2 displays a breakdown of the final sample by year.
All firms were assigned to their respective sector (sector and
industry are considered interchangeably) based on the Global
Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Appendix C shows
a breakdown of the final sample by industry. In order to re-
duce the effect of possibly spurious outliers in the tails of the
sample, I winsorize the independent continuous variables at
the top and bottom one percent.8
5.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of all variables.
According to the variables of interest, the untabulated statis-
tics for the book-to-market ratio reveals a mean value of
0.334, indicating that the shareholders of these sample firms
perceive these firms to be highly profitable. Even firms in the
ninetyfifth percentile show a book-to-market ratio of 0.763
and thus below one. However, as shown in Table 1 there are
44 firm-year observations with a book-to-market ratio above
one. The proportion of equity shares held by the firm’s top
one institutional owner vary between 1% and 22.6%, with
an average value of 7%. For the firm’s top three institutional
owners the values vary between 2.9% and 34.5% with an
average value of 12.9%, respectively. These values reveal a
certain degree of heterogeneity in the ownership structure
among the sample firms. Mean of Impair indicates that in
10.5% of the firm-years, the sample firms report an impair-
ment of goodwill.
The mean values of Return and ReturnLag differ no-
tably, which might be partially driven by the fact that
8To test for the sensitivity of the decision whether to winsorize the data, I
re-perform the main analysis without winsorization. The inferences remain
unchanged.
ReturnLag includes the returns of the year 2008 and thus
the stock market crash caused by the financial crisis as in-
dicated by the increased standard deviation of 32.9%. In
30.3% of the firm-years, firms tend to engage in earnings
smoothing (Smooth), whereas only 4.5% of the firm-years
show evidence of big bath accounting (Bath). Regarding the
CEO-related control variables, the CEO of the sample firms
received a bonus payment in 12.2% of firm-year observa-
tions. Furthermore, sample firms report a change in the CEO
role in 10.7% of the firm-years. The mean level of lever-
age reaches 57.6%, indicating that selected firms are largely
financed by debt rather than equity. Thus, debt covenants
of contracts written on goodwill accounts and the resulting
incentives to delay or avoid goodwill impairments might
play a role. The sample firms reveal an average number of
operating segments of 3.703. The number of operating seg-
ments varies between 1 and 11. Furthermore, sample firms
report a goodwill-to-assets ratio of 21.2% with a maximum
value of 60.3%. The mean sample firm reports a profitable
return on assets of 7.2%, whereas at the final ninetyfifth
percentile firms report a return on assets of 17.1%. The Size
variable, defined as the logarithm of total assets before good-
will impairment, ranges from 6.695 to 12.528. On average,
there are 17 analysts following the firm (determined by the
exponential of the logarithm value in Table 2, less one).
In Table 4, I perform a mean difference analysis to test for
significant differences between firms that impair and those
that do not. I find significant evidence that firms with a
book-to-market ratio above one are more likely to engage in
a goodwill impairment decision indicating that a firm’s book-
to-market ratio is an adequate measure for market indica-
tions of goodwill impairment. Furthermore, impairing firms
tend to have a slightly more concentrated ownership struc-
ture with respect to the proportion of equity shares held by
the top one and the top three institutional owners, respec-
tively. However, for both ownership variables, OS_Top1 and
OS_Top3, this difference is not statistically significant.
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Table 2: Sample breakdown by year
Year Number of observations Impairments Percentage
2009 235 40 8.17%
2010 238 20 8.27%
2011 241 19 8.38%
2012 242 29 8.41%
2013 252 23 8.76%
2014 278 26 9.66%
2015 273 28 9.48%
2016 280 24 9.73%
2017 287 23 9.98%
2018 283 33 9.84%
2019 268 37 9.32%
Total 2877 302 100%
This table shows a breakdown of the sample by year.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of all variables
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. St.Dev.
Percentiles
10 95
Btm 0.015 0 0 1 0.123 0 0
OS_Top1 0.07 0.065 0.01 0.226 0.036 0.03 0.137
OS_Top3 0.129 0.12 0.029 0.345 0.06 0.059 0.244
Impair 0.105 0 0 1 0.307 0 1
Return 0.122 0.13 -0.828 1.32 0.269 -0.202 0.543
ReturnLag 0.068 0.106 -1.637 1.32 0.329 -0.337 0.538
Smooth 0.303 0 0 1 0.46 0 1
Bath 0.045 0 0 1 0.208 0 0
Bonus 0.122 0 0 1 0.327 0 1
CeoChange 0.107 0 0 1 0.309 0 1
Leverage 0.576 0.582 0.113 0.986 0.179 0.338 0.869
Segment 3.703 4 1 11 2.327 1 8
GW/TA 0.212 0.186 0 0.603 0.153 0.022 0.498
Size 9.493 9.45 6.695 12.528 1.217 7.926 11.639
Anal ystFol low 2.698 2.89 0 3.871 0.784 1.946 3.497
Roa 0.072 0.067 -0.213 0.341 0.062 0.01 0.171
Firm-year observations 2877
This table reports descriptive statistics of all variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the first and
ninetyninth percentiles. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
With respect to the control variables, impairing firms tend
to underperform both contemporaneous and lagged stock
market returns versus non-impairing firms. The mean differ-
ence analysis also reveals a positive association between the
change of the CEO and big bath accounting on the one hand
and the goodwill impairment decision on the other hand. Fi-
nally, impairing firms appear to be larger, have more operat-
ing segments, report a lower return on assets, and display a
higher debt-to-assets, as well as a goodwill-to-assets ratio.
5.4. Correlation analysis
In addition to the descriptive statistics, I conduct Bravais-
Pearson, and Spearman (rank) correlation analysis to exam-
ine the linear relationship between all independent variables.
The results are outlined in Table 5, where Bravais-Pearson
correlations are shown in the lower left triangle and Spear-
man (rank) correlations are provided in the upper right tri-
angle.
None of the two independent variables of interest (Btm,
OS_Top1, and OS_Top3) show a correlation above the level
of 0.4. Following the ranges provided by Evans (1996), I
conclude that there is only a very weak to a weak correlation
between the two variables on institutional ownership and the
remaining control variables.9 Thus, multicollinearity is not
9Evans (1996) defines a correlation as very weak if it ranges between
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Table 4: Mean differences
Variable Impair=0 Impair=1 t-statistics
Btm 0.012 0.040 -3.666***
OS_Top1 0.070 0.072 -0.664
OS_Top3 0.129 0.134 -1.282
Return 0.129 0.064 3.984***
ReturnLag 0.081 -0.042 6.188***
Smooth 0.308 0.261 1.645
Bath 0.028 0.195 -13.703***
Bonus 0.118 0.152 -1.702
CeoChange 0.101 0.162 -3.284***
Leverage 0.572 0.608 -3.343***
Segment 3.636 4.272 -4.505***
GW/TA 0.209 0.240 -3.378***
Size 9.458 9.789 -4.488***
Anal ystFol low 2.701 2.673 0.579
Roa 0.076 0.035 11.050***
Firm-year observations 2575 302
This table show mean values for non-impairing and impairing firm-years. p-values are two-tailed and indicated as
stars according to their significance level as follows: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. All continuous variables
are winsorized at the first and ninetyninth percentiles. All variables are defined in Appendix A
Table 5: Bravais-Pearson and Spearman (rank) correlations of all independent variables
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
1.Btm 0.007 0.036 -0.130*** -0.04* -0.002 0.123*** 0.006 0.003 -0.057** 0.005 0.002 0.091*** 0.000 -0.130***
2.OS_Top1 0.009 0.777*** 0.048* 0.008 0.069*** 0.054** -0.041* -0.006 -0.070*** -0.143*** 0.112*** -0.291*** -0.088*** -0.077*
3.OS_Top3 0.039* 0.768*** 0.038* 0.013 0.073*** 0.081*** -0.01 -0.009 -0.079*** -0.150*** 0.112*** -0.371*** -0.142*** -0.099***
4.Return -0.136*** 0.041* 0.027 -0.108*** 0.112*** -0.082*** -0.007 -0.033 -0.026 -0.056** -0.003 -0.119*** -0.048* 0.061**
5.ReturnLag -0.041* -0.028 -0.017 -0.163*** 0.144*** -0.114*** -0.033 -0.059** -0.015 -0.034 0.017 -0.069*** 0.008 0.166***
6.Smooth -0.002 0.062*** 0.072*** 0.126*** 0.129*** -0.143*** -0.024 -0.037* -0.014 -0.033 -0.022 -0.020 -0.032 0.127***
7.Bath 0.123*** 0.060** 0.077*** -0.098*** -0.115*** -0.143*** 0.026 0.065*** 0.038 0.015 0.004 0.029 0.016 -0.35***
8.Bonus 0.005 -0.041* -0.009 0.000 -0.046* -0.024 0.026 0.077*** -0.0411* 0.068*** 0.032 0.013 -0.065*** -0.024
9.CeoChange 0.003 -0.011 -0.011 -0.035 -0.055** -0.037* 0.065*** 0.077*** 0.0172 0.002 0.000 0.032 0.016 -0.027
10.Leverage -0.055** -0.078*** -0.090*** -0.034 -0.013 -0.019 0.037* -0.046* 0.021 0.112*** -0.068*** 0.308*** -0.029 -0.296***
11.Segment 0.000 -0.137*** -0.148*** -0.062*** -0.041* -0.034 0.013 0.080*** 0.008 0.116*** 0.180*** 0.296*** -0.107*** -0.166***
12.GW/TA 0.001 0.123*** 0.109*** -0.0103 0.019 -0.020 0.003 0.045* 0.000 -0.055** 0.157*** -0.032 -0.085*** -0.079***
13.Size 0.081*** -0.281*** -0.354*** -0.119*** -0.049** 0.023 0.023 0.019 0.035 0.316*** 0.311*** -0.025 0.350*** -0.260***
14.Anal ystFol low -0.006 -0.029 -0.058** -0.039* 0.023 -0.030 0.018 -0.088*** -0.013 0.013 -0.075*** -0.056** 0.231*** 0.113***
15.Roa -0.118*** -0.077*** -0.112*** 0.086*** 0.165*** 0.160*** -0.456*** -0.036 -0.038* -0.244*** -0.149*** -0.116*** -0.192*** 0.049**
This table shows Bravais-Pearson correlations in the lower left triangle. Spearman (rank) correlations are provided in the upper right triangle. p-values are two-tailed and indicated
as stars according to their significance level as follows: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. All continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninetyninth percentiles. All variables
are defined in Appendix A.
expected to be a relevant issue for the independent variables
of interest.
However, it is worth noting that some of the control vari-
ables show significant correlation effects with other indepen-
dent variables, namely Roa, Size, Btm, Anal ystFol low, and
Segment. Again, none of the correlations exceeds the level
of 0.4, and thus, multicollinearity is not expected to be a rel-
evant issue either. Furthermore, there are no substantial dif-
ferences between Bravais-Pearson and Spearman (rank) cor-
relations, which suggests that there are no significant outlier
effects in the final sample.
0.00 and 0.19 and as weak if it ranges between 0.20 and 0.39, in absolute
terms, respectively.
5.5. Multivariate analysis
This section presents the results of the multivariate linear
probability model. Table 6 shows the results of two regres-
sion models that estimate the effect of the top one (OS_Top1)
and the cumulative share of the top three institutional own-
ers (OS_Top3) on the goodwill impairment decision when
a firm shows market indications of goodwill impairment, re-
spectively. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable
equal to 1 if a firm impaired goodwill in a given firm-year,
and 0 otherwise. The adjusted R-squared is reported in the
fourth last row, and the sample size is reported in the last
row. Both models control for year and industry fixed effects.
Regression model (1) ((2)) includes an interaction term
between the proportion of equity shares held by the firm’s top
one (three) institutional owners and a dichotomous variable
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Table 6: Regression results
Variable Pred. Sign
(1) (2)
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
Btm + 0.05 1.08 0.025 0.54
OS_Top1 + 0 0.08
OS_Top3 + 0.004 0.44
Btm×OS_Top1 + 0.0965** 2.33
Btm×OS_Top3 + 0.104** 2.17
Return - -0.019*** -2.99 -0.020*** -3.03
ReturnLag - -0.022*** -2.83 -0.022*** -2.8
Smooth + 0.030** 2.42 0.030** 2.38
Bath + 0.281*** 6.59 0.282*** 6.57
Bonus - 0.006 0.29 0.007 0.31
CeoChange + 0.03 1.45 0.031 1.49
Leverage ? 0.002 0.3 0.003 0.32
Segment + 0.019** 2.2 0.019** 2.2
GW/TA ? 0.006 0.9 0.006 0.84
Size ? 0.011 1.16 0.013 1.29
Anal ystFol low + -0.004 -0.45 -0.004 -0.48
Roa - -0.035*** -4.49 -0.034*** -4.34
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.113
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm-year observations 2877 2877
This table presents the estimation results of a multivariate linear probability model. The table presents regression
coefficients and the respective t-statistics. p-values are two-tailed and indicated as stars according to their signif-
icance level as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered on the firm-level
(Petersen, 2009). All continuous variables are standardized. All continuous variables are winsorized at the first
and ninetyninth percentiles. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
whether the firm’s book-to-market ratio is above one. The
regression results show significantly positive effects on this
interaction term for both models, respectively (t-statistics =
2.33 and 2.17).
Consequently, I find statistically significant evidence that
firms with larger concentration of ownership are more likely
to report goodwill impairment when the firm shows market
indications of goodwill impairment. Ceteris paribus, among
the firm-years that show market indications of goodwill im-
pairment, one standard deviation point increase in the cumu-
lative proportion of equity shares held by the top one (three)
institutional owners (OS_Top1 and OS_Top3) has a signifi-
cant positive effect of 9.65% (10.4%) on the likelihood for
a firm to actually report an impairment of goodwill. The
adjusted R-squared for both models is comparable to those
documented in prior research.10 Thus, the results provides
evidence that large institutional owners effectively monitor
firms towards an impairment when the firm shows market in-
dications of goodwill impairment. To test for multicollinear-
ity issues, I perform a variance inflation factor assessment.
10The adjusted R-squared in Table 5 for both models is 11.8% similar to
the results of other papers on the goodwill impairment decision (e.g., Glaum
et al., 2018; Ramanna & Watts, 2012).
Untabulated results suggest that there are no serious multi-
collinearity issues impacting my results.11
With regard to the control variables, my results are
broadly in line with the findings of prior research and thus
providing further validation for my main results as well as
the model itself. For both regression models, both contem-
poraneous and lagged stock market returns (Return and
ReturnLag) are significantly negatively related to the good-
will impairment decision. These findings are in line with the
findings by Glaum et al. (2018). The coefficients of the two
control variables related to earnings management (Smooth
and Bath) display the expected positive sign. However,
only the variable related to the big bath theory of earnings
management shows a significant coefficient.
Concerning the CEO-related control variables, Bonus and
CeoChange, I find coefficients consistent with the predicted
sign. However, both variables are not significant.12 The
11Following the recommended maximum values for the variance inflation
factor provided by Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (1998), I use a maxi-
mum tolerance value of ten. All variables of interest are comfortable below
this value.
12According to Glaum et al. (2018), it may be the case that CeoChange
reflects effects that are similar to Bath and thus subject to multicollinearity.
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coefficient of the control variable related to debt-covenant,
Leverage, is insignificantly slightly positive. This finding is
supported by Beatty and Weber (2006), who also find small
insignificant coefficients for the firm’s debt-to-assets ratio.
Finally, my finding on the firm’s number of operating seg-
ments, Segments, reveal a significant positive effect in line
with prior research (Glaum et al., 2018; Lapointe-Antunes et
al., 2008). To sum up, the results of the multivariate linear
probability model provide evidence in line with the monitor-
ing hypothesis. The control variables of the model are gen-
erally consistent with the findings by prior research in terms
of both significance and magnitude.
6. Robustness analyses
To further validate my results on the influence of large in-
stitutional ownership on the decision whether to record nec-
essary impairments of goodwill, I conduct additional robust-
ness analyses to stress the economic relevance and provide
further validity. First, I narrow the definition of the depen-
dent variable to those impairments that are material to the
firm. Second, the main results are based on a market-related
indicator for goodwill impairment. In order to analyze the
sensitivity of the definition of the impairment indicator proxy
used in the main analysis, I estimate the model using an al-
ternative accounting-based measure for indications of good-
will impairment. Lastly, I follow recent literature and exclude
the year 2009, which belongs to the period of the financial
crisis, from the sample. All three specifications prove to be
robust with regard to my main results. Thus, the subsequent
robustness analyses provide further evidence on the role of
large institutional owners monitoring firms towards neces-
sary goodwill impairments.
6.1. Dependent variable
The first robustness analysis aims to provide further ev-
idence on the economic relevance of the influence of large
institutional owners on necessary goodwill impairments. In
order to do so, I narrow the definition of the dependent vari-
able to those impairments that are material to the firm. Thus,
I modify equation (1) by specifying the dependent variable,
Impair, equal to 1 if the reported goodwill impairment is
classified as a material impairment, and 0 otherwise. In-
spired by Jarva (2009), I define an impairment of goodwill
as material if it exceeds $10 million (model (1) and (2)). Al-
ternatively, I define an impairment of goodwill as material
if it exceeds 1% of the firm’s total assets before the impair-
ment (Model 3 and 4). The final sample reveals 257 (123)
impairments with a magnitude exceeding $10 million (1% of
total assets) compared to a number of 302 total impairments.
All independent variables remain the same as those included
in equation (1). Both specifications prove to be significantly
positive for both the top one and the top three institutional
owners, respectively.
Table 7 shows the results of the specification. The co-
efficients are largely consistent in magnitude with my main
results. Thus, these results provide further evidence on the
role of large institutional owners on necessary goodwill im-
pairments. Furthermore, this specification represents impair-
ments with increased economic impact, which are particu-
larly relevant in the tension between the diverging interests
of the principal and the agent. Therefore, I argue that these
results reinforce monitoring by large institutional owners as
a governance device reducing agency costs.
6.2. Independent variable
As the initial measure for impairment expectations is
based on market values (Btm), I use an accounting-related
measure (Return on assets) to test the robustness of the main
results. I use the firm’s return on assets (Roa) to proxy for
circumstances in which goodwill has potentially lost its eco-
nomic value and is consequently subject to impairment. This
argument is supported by the mean difference analysis (Ta-
ble 4), where impairing firms reveal a significant lower return
on assets. Thus, I define an impairment of goodwill as neces-
sary if the firm reports a return on assets below the value of
minus 10%.13 Accordingly, I create a dichotomous variable,
RoaD, equal to 1 if the firm’s return on assets is below the
value of minus 10% in a given firm-year, and 0 otherwise. I
adjust equation (1) by replacing the continuous variable Roa
with the dichotomous variable RoaD. Furthermore, I replace
the dichotomous variable Btm with a continuous variable of
the firm’s book-to-market ratio. All other variables remain
the same as those included in equation (1). Table 8 displays
the results of the replaced variable as well as for the adjusted
interaction term. I continue to document significantly posi-
tive results. Considering that an accounting-related measure
is somehow different from a market-related measure, I in-
terpret these findings as supporting evidence for my primary
inferences.
6.3. Excluding 2009
As a further test of robustness, I follow recent literature
and perform a sample cut to exclude observations belong-
ing to the year 2009, i.e. the year of the financial crisis. By
doing so, I ensure that my results are not driven by observa-
tions incurred during this time. Indeed, the sample reveals
the largest proportion of goodwill impairments in that year.
Thus, it may be the case that there are exceptional condi-
tions related to the financial crisis that impact the goodwill
impairment decision. I estimate equation (1) after excluding
observations from 2009. Again, the results remain signifi-
cantly positive for the variables of interest. I do not tabulate
these results for brevity.
7. Limitations and future research
Even though the paper provides some evidence that the
largest institutional owners effectively monitor firms towards
13Ayres et al. (2019) use a similar approach by incorporating the con-
tinuous value of the return on assets in their interaction term as the main
variable of interest.
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Table 7: Robustness tests of dependent variable
Variable
Impairments Impairments
>$10 million >1% of total assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Btm
0.123*** 0.097** 0.061 0.035











Adjusted R-squared 0.175 0.1176 0.121 0.122
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year observations 2877 2877 2877 2877
This table presents the estimation results of a multivariate linear probability model. The table presents regression
coefficients and the respective t-statistics in parentheses. p-values are two-tailed and indicated as stars according
to their significance level as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered on the
firm-level (Petersen, 2009). All continuous variables are standardized. All continuous variables are winsorized at
the first and ninetyninth percentiles. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 8: Robustness tests of independent variable
Variable
(1) (2)
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
RoaD 0.176** 2.46 0.122 1.53
OS_Top1 0.002 0.29
OS_Top3 0.006 0.74
Road ×OS_Top1 0.185*** 3.5
Road ×OS_Top3 0.177*** 2.99
Adjusted R-squared 0.114 0.114
Control variables Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm-year observations 2877 2877
This table presents the estimation results of a multivariate linear probability model. The table presents regression
coefficients and the respective t-statistics. p-values are two-tailed and indicated as stars according to their signif-
icance level as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered on the firm-level
(Petersen, 2009). All continuous variables are standardized. All continuous variables are winsorized at the first
and ninetyninth percentiles. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
necessary goodwill impairments, I acknowledge several lim-
itations related to this paper.
First, my results only provide an association, but not a
causal relationship, between the proportions of equity shares
held by the firm’s top institutional owners and the goodwill
impairment decision. In particular, potential endogeneity is-
sues regarding the institutional ownership variables may bias
my results. For instance, the results may be subject to a self-
selection bias in the sense that institutional owners prefer-
ably invest in firms with relatively strong governance mecha-
nisms. Because strong governance mechanisms may promote
both the degree of institutional ownership concertation and
the goodwill impairment decision, the results may be biased
upwards. Thus, it is encouraged that future research inves-
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tigates the relationship by making use of different empirical
models.14
Second, the sample only consists of U.S. publicly listed
firms, which limits the generalizability of my results. Because
research results on that topic are quite diverse and vary by the
country examined, further research should investigate how
the results change if the analysis is conducted including mul-
tiple countries.15 Further, because the sample is limited to
firms belonging to the S&P 500, the results are only valid for
relatively large firms. Therefore, one might expect a some-
what different result for smaller firms.
Third, this paper is limited to the role of institutional own-
ers in monitoring fair value estimates of goodwill subsequent
to business combinations (i.e. ex-post monitoring). One
potential concern is that institutional owners may intervene
prior to an acquisition takes place and thus prevent unprof-
itable or overpriced business combinations ex-ante (i.e. ex-
ante monitoring). Based on the finding by Gu and Lev (2011)
that the overvaluation of the firm’s share causes managers to
undertake value-destroying acquisitions, I encourage future
research to shed light on the ex-ante influence of large insti-
tutional owners on business combinations and the resulting
goodwill impairment charges in later years.
8. Conclusion
This paper examines the role of large institutional own-
ers on the goodwill impairment decision when a firm shows
market indications of goodwill impairment. The data used
consists of 343 U.S. publicly listed firms during the period
2009 to 2019, resulting in 2877 firm-year observations. I test
whether ownership concentration indicated by the share of
equities held by the firm’s largest institutional owners is asso-
ciated with an increase of the likelihood for a firm to report a
necessary impairment of goodwill. Following prior research,
I define the firm’s book-to-market ratio as a suitable proxy
for market indications of goodwill impairment (Beatty & We-
ber, 2006; Francis et al., 1996; Ramanna & Watts, 2012).
Hence, firms with positive goodwill on their balance sheet
and a book-to-market ratio above one are expected to record
a goodwill impairment.
Estimating a multivariate linear probability model, I find
evidence that the largest institutional owners effectively help
in diminishing the available managerial discretion in the an-
nual goodwill impairment test through their monitoring ac-
tivities in order to protect their significant investments. I am,
to the best of my knowledge, the first empirically arguing that
large institutional owners effectively monitor firms towards
14For instance, prior studies on institutional ownership use a propensity
score model in order to control for potential endogeneity issues of institu-
tional ownership, e.g. Lindemanis, Loze, and Pajuste (2019). Alternatively,
other papers use an instrumental variable two-stage least squares approach
to deal with potential endogeneity issues, e.g. Callen and Fang (2013).
15Glaum et al. (2018) find that the strength of a country’s enforcement
regime affects both the timeliness and the managerial incentives related to
the goodwill impairment decision.
a necessary impairment decision. Therefore, there is no prior
research with which I can directly compare my results.
The results for both the top one institutional owner and
the cumulative share of equity held by the top three institu-
tional owners are consistent as they provide evidence for ef-
fective monitoring towards necessary goodwill impairments.
In the broadest sense, these results expand the literature on
the influence of institutional ownership on financial report-
ing outcomes and, in particular, on the goodwill impairment
decision. My results are in line with the active monitoring hy-
pothesis and the associated theory of an increased incentive
of larger shareholders to monitor the firm (Huddart, 1993;
Maug, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Thus, large institu-
tional owners effectively reduce agency costs by diminishing
the available managerial discretion of the impairment-only
approach towards the interest of shareholders. In this con-
nection, my results provide further evidence on the finding
by Callen and Fang (2013) that institutional owners prevent
management from hoarding bad news. Furthermore, my re-
sults are in accordance with findings reported by Li and Sloan
(2017). Their cross-sectional regression results suggest that
institutional ownership leads to more timely impairment de-
cisions. A somewhat related paper on the firm’s information
environment by Ayres et al. (2019) concludes that higher an-
alyst coverage increases the likelihood of an impairment. In
that vein, my results offer further evidence on the positive
influence of the firm’s information environment on the im-
pairment decision, i.e. the monitoring by large institutional
owners.
A common point of criticism of the impairment-only ap-
proach versus the systematic amortization approach is the
lack to provide more value-relevant information with respect
to the true economic value of goodwill due to managerial
discretion prevalent in the annual impairment test. Against
this background, my results show that monitoring by institu-
tional owners can help to substitute the lack of the SFAS 142
regime to enforce transparency regarding the true economic
value of goodwill.
Overall, this paper adds to extant academic research in
two ways. In a more general context, I look at the effect
of institutional ownership on firms’ financial reporting be-
havior and find that they monitor firms towards more timely
goodwill impairments. In the context of goodwill, I show
that ownership concentration indicated by the share of eq-
uity held by the firm’s largest institutional owner is a further
determinant of the manager’s goodwill impairment decision.
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